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A recent study prepared for the EU Commission1 has found that EU listed companies are 
increasingly focused on the short-term financial benefits of shareholders rather than long-term 
interests and sustainable value creation. It argues that the root causes of this behaviour lie 
within the regulatory framework and market practices (i.e. lack of a strategic perspective on 
sustainability, short-term focus of board-member mandates, and remuneration), and alleges 
that this will both undermine the investment capacity of firms and harm cash balances. 
In response to this alleged short-termism, the EU Commission is considering a series of 
measures such as: harmonising directors’ duties and board composition; incentivising long-
term shareholding; reducing quarterly reporting; and broadening reporting targets. The study’s 
conclusions were strongly contested by top academics in both the EU and the US (see for 
example Roe et al., 2020) – a challenge that was at first not matched by the relevant European 
professional associations. 
Attempts to harmonise company law concerned with corporate governance are as old as the 
single market, but have not advanced much given that governance is closely linked to the 
national system of property rights and the general economic order in every member state. 
Unlike securities law, differences in company law (e.g. directors’ liability, shares and voting 
rights) are not seen as a barrier to the single market, except for anti-takeover defence 
structures. The latter was the subject of several proposals, with the Takeover Bids Directive 
finally agreed in 2003, although this was far from perfect. 
More recently, the EU adopted the Shareholder Rights Directive (SRD II), which facilitates cross-
border voting, and requires both more disclosure of directors’ pay and the adoption of 
guidelines on non-financial reporting. This time the debate is driven by the sustainability 
                                                     
1 EC (2020), “Study on directors’ duties and sustainable corporate governance”, 29 July, European Commission. 
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question and the possible adaptations to the EU regulatory framework on company law and 
corporate governance.2 
The study 
In order to assess the origins of short-termism in corporate governance, the study examines 
the amount of net corporate funds used for pay-outs to shareholders (e.g. dividends, shares 
buybacks). It then compares this to the amount used to create value over the life cycle of the 
firm (e.g. investment in infrastructure and sustainability, workers training, research and 
development). The hypothesis justifying this approach is based on the argument that the 
increasing payments to shareholders will decrease the available resources to invest (e.g. in 
R&D, human capital or other kinds of capital expenditures), and thus jeopardise future 
productivity growth. In other words, pay-outs crowd out real investments, resulting in a shift in 
corporate strategy from ‘retain-and-reinvest’ to ‘downsize-and-distribute’. 
Using a sample of 4,719 listed companies in 16 European countries3 over the period 1992-2018, 
the study arrives at four main conclusions. First, shareholders’ pay-outs increased from less 
than 20% of total income in 1992 to nearly 60% in 2018. Second, the ratios of CAPEX and R&D 
to net income decreased by 45 and 38 percentage points between 1992 and 2018 respectively. 
Third, countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal and Slovakia have larger shares of cash 
paid-out than Hungary and Poland.4 Fourth, sectors such as food, and oil and gas, have the 
largest share of total pay-outs, compared with transport and construction. 
Findings should be treated cautiously 
These findings are highly questionable, in terms of the methodology and the measurement 
criteria used, the bias and reference to cherry-picking empirical studies, and the conclusions. 
On the conceptual side, the use of gross corporate payouts to measure the increase/decrease 
of short-termism may lead to false conclusions, given that shareholder value creation is not 
necessarily a short-term phenomenon.5  
Perhaps a better payout measure would have been to use net shareholder payouts, which not 
only take into account capital movements between a firm and its shareholders, but also 
consider direct and indirect equity issuance by the firm (Skinner, 2008; Floyd et al., 2015; Fried 
                                                     
2 The current consultation has attracted further criticism since the questionnaire it is based on is written in a way 
that allows answers that either reject sustainability or endorse the Commission’s initiative (and the study). Given 
that few would do the former, one can only expect near total support for the latter (ECLE, 2020). 
3 Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
4 The country analysis performed for the period 2016-18. 
5 The shareholder value model is based on the present value of future cash flows, which reflects the future risk 
and opportunities to generating returns. It has therefore been widely used to illustrate the influence of 
environmental, social and governance factors on companies’ risk-adjusted performance. 
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and Wang, 2019). Rather than considering only capital outflows, a more holistic approach 
would take capital inflows into account as well.6 
A new study found that, after accounting large equity issuances by EU listed corporations, net 
shareholder payouts are relatively modest, leaving ample resources for investment (Fried and 
Wang, 2020). For the period 1992-2019, results show no evidence of excessive pay-outs 
through dividends or repurchases among EU listed corporations. This is because equity issuance 
was consistently higher than repurchases and net shareholder pay-outs were about half of total 
net income.7 In other words, findings rebut the proposition that companies are neglecting their 
responsibilities towards sustainability in pursuit of short-term profits. 
An interesting observation that the study prepared for the EU Commission fails to consider is 
that the distributed funds (from the company to shareholders) can be re-invested back into the 
company, or re-deployed in other listed companies with cutting-edge research and sustainable 
investment projects. Thus, higher returns for shareholders incentivise both retail and 
institutional investors to invest more, and consequently strengthen the equity base of 
companies (Roe, 2018). 
Other aspects could have been taken into account that may significantly impact the findings. 
For example, the extremely low interest rate regime that most countries have experienced 
during recent years may have incentivised companies not to accumulate cash but instead to 
pay it out to the shareholders, or use it to repurchase/buyback their shares (Elgouacem and 
Zago, 2020). Also, the various crises that took place over the examined period (i.e. banking 
crises in Finland and Sweden, dot-com crisis, global financial crisis, European debt crisis) may 
have forced companies to take a short-term approach in their decisions and business strategies, 
with a focus on realising short-term capital gains (CFA, 2020). 
Last but not least, the study provides insufficient information about the selection and the 
composition of the companies used, and their variation in terms of size, ownership type, 
corporate and business model.8 Moreover, the cross-country analysis has not taken into 
account national differences in terms of company law and taxation, for example.9 The inclusion 
of UK companies in the sample – a country that has left the EU – may also have biased 
                                                     
6 Regarding the investment indicators employed by the study, the use of CAPEX and R&D investments neglects 
those investments realised indirectly through mergers and acquisitions (M&A) (Bianchi and Milič, 2020). 
Moreover, the heterogeneous classification and disclosure of R&D investments across the EU may hinder the 
accuracy/quality of such measures (EC, 2020). 
7 In particular, among smaller firms the net shareholder pay-out was negative. 
8 Substantial discrepancies occur among different types of companies. For example, growth companies should 
have a higher proportion of R&D investments than value companies, while cooperatives or mutual companies 
have different governance structures and aims other than maximising profit. Regarding corporate governance 
models, Nordic companies are characterised by a more active governance role played by major shareholders (and 
stronger shareholder rights), while UK companies have a more dispersed governance mode. 
9 Although shareholders receive their financial return in the form of capital gains as well as dividends/share 
buybacks, the national tax treatment between capital gains and dividends varies substantially across EU member 
states. This means that some countries may favour dividends over capital gains. See, for example, the rankings of 
European countries in the Financial Complexity Index (TMF, 2018). 
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conclusions that are intended to form the basis of reforms exclusively in the EU27. In summary, 
several robustness checks could have been performed in order to confirm the validity of the 
findings. 
The way forward 
What is missing from the debate on directors’ duties and sustainable corporate governance is 
the link with the Capital Markets Union (CMU) project and the objective to promote market 
finance. Today, EU companies rely on bank finance for 70% of their external financing, and 
often do not consider alternative external sources – which is certainly the case for small and 
mid-sized companies. This puts them at a competitive disadvantage with other regions, where 
market finance is abundantly available and allows start-ups to grow much faster. More market 
finance is a necessary alternative to bank-based finance, also from a financial stability 
perspective, and the EU Commission is busily engaged in ensuring that this is available. 
Ideas that undermine the attractiveness of capital markets and aim to limit shareholder pay 
and reduce shareholder disclosure should be avoided. The polarity of short- versus long-
termism is also misguided from a capital markets perspective. Companies seek short-term 
capital on the basis of long-term business plans. Investors are remunerated for risk taking, via 
dividends (which are in most countries heavily taxed, and often taxed twice when they cross 
borders). Limiting disclosure hampers the translation of information into prices (Fishman and 
Hagerty, 1989; Bond and Goldstein, 2012; Chung et al., 2016),10 and reduces the attractiveness 
of market finance (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Goldstein and Yang, 2017). 
The Commission’s commitment to further sustainability is laudable, and there is broad support 
for many of its initiatives that would help investors pursue sustainability. However, the current 
initiative on sustainable corporate governance is premised on a study that should be treated 
cautiously, especially when forming the basis for legislative action. Investors are not enemies 
of sustainability and as such should not be prevented from exercising real influence over 
companies. On the contrary, investors are the very people driving companies to consider all 
foreseeable risks, including those arising from climate change.11 
To conclude, the study prepared for the European Commission assesses the root causes of 
short-termism in corporate governance from a very narrow perspective. Thus, it offers only one 
piece of the puzzle. In order to understand what drives short-termism, and whether or not EU 
listed companies are becoming more short-termist, a holistic approach is required. 
                                                     
10 On the one hand, disclosure can help mitigate information asymmetry between the firm and investors, and thus 
enhance price efficiency. On the other hand, disclosure can crowd out incentives of (potential) investors to acquire 
and produce new information (Gao and Liang, 2013; Goldstein and Yang, 2019), resulting in prices being less 
informative. Therefore, whether less disclosure hampers revelatory price efficiency or not is an ongoing empirical 
question. 
11 For example, companies engaged in environmentally damaging activities like oil or gas exploration should not 
be shielded from investor influence and left to do what they like with their cash. Instead, they should be subject 
to investor pressure in order to adopt a sustainable business plan that will attract further investments (cash paid 
out to investors is more likely to be reinvested in a company that promises a sustainable business than if it were 
saved). 
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In allowing companies and investors to make well-informed decisions long term, more 
information should become available short term – not the opposite. The Commission is 
engaged in revising the non-financial reporting requirements, and in implementing a taxonomy 
on sustainability risks. But more is needed at the EU level, such as: EU-wide norms and 
supervision of the audit profession; abolition of double withholding taxes on dividends; linking 
of executive remuneration to long-term sustainable targets; and the promotion of employee 
share ownership, among other measures. 
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